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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the scope of the powers of the Minister of Finance 
upon a request from the Minister of Trade and Industry to amend 
Schedule 1 to the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (hereafter, CEA) 
in respect of imported goods as provided by section 48(1)(b) of the 
CEA. This assessment entails a case analysis of the High Court 
decisions in South Africa Sugar Association v the Minister of Trade and 
Industry 2017 4 All SA 555 (GP) and Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Finance 2017 ZAWCHC 110 (29 September 2017). These two cases 
offer for the first time, clarification on the nature of the power conferred 
on the Minister of Finance by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. The High 
Court in these two cases rejected the argument that the role of the 
Minister of Finance in respect of the power conferred upon him/her by 
section 48(1)(b) is that of a "registrar" who merely 'rubberstamps' the 
decision of the Minister of Trade and Industry. Consequently, the High 
Court in both matters held that a veto power is conferred on the Minister 
of Finance which permits him/her to either accept or decline the request 
of the Minister of Trade and Industry to amend Schedule 1 of the 
CEA.To the contrary, this paper argues that if the Minister of Finance 
declines the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry, s/he is not 
'giving effect' to the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry as 
required by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA and is thus acting ultra vires 
because s/he is assuming powers which never conferred on him/her 
by the legislature. This paper also argues that the High Court in both 
matters, misconstrued the relationship between section 48(1)(b) and 
the "public interest" provisions in section 48 and thus unjustifiably 
stripped the Minister of Trade and Industry of his/her power to 
implement an amendment to Schedule 1. In the final analysis, this 
paper explores the impact of the Customs Duty Act 30 of 2014 on the 
Minister of Finance's powers in this regard.  
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1  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the scope of the powers of the 
Minister of Finance upon a request from the Minister of Trade and Industry 
to amend Schedule 1 to the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (hereafter, 
CEA), in respect of imported goods as provided for by section 48(1)(b) of 
the CEA. This assessment entails a case analysis of the High Court 
decisions in South Africa Sugar Association v the Minister of Trade and 
Industry1 and Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance (hereafter, 
Pioneer Foods).2 These two cases are particularly instructive in that they 
offer for the first time, clarification on the nature of the power conferred on 
the Minister of Finance by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. This paper concludes 
by exploring the impact of the Customs Duty Act 30 of 2014 (hereafter, CDA) 
on the powers of the Minister of Finance in this regard. This enquiry is 
necessitated by the fact that the CDA and the Customs Control Act 31 of 
2014 will collectively replace the provisions of the CEA in respect of custom 
duties at a date to be determined by the President.3 
2  The factual background  
The dispute in South Africa Sugar Association v the Minister of Trade and 
Industry (hereafter, SASA) was precipitated by the Minister of Finance's 
decision to zero rate imported sugar, which meant that imported sugar was 
not subject to any import duty.4 Unfortunately, this zero rating was based on 
outdated information and the result was that the sugar price used was 
almost US$ 200 higher than the 20-day average on the day the zero rating 
was gazetted.5 The South Africa Sugar Association (hereafter, the Sugar 
Association) notified the International Trade Administration Commission 
(hereafter, ITAC) of its concerns in this regard, and consequently its 
representatives met with ITAC on 2 August 2017.6 ITAC made a 
                                            
* Clive Vinti. LLB cum laude (UFH) LLM (UCT). Lecturer, University of the Free State, 
South Africa. Email: vintic@ufs.ac.za. I am grateful for the invaluable comments of, 
Zimkhitha Vinti, the anonymous reviewers and HS, without whom this paper would 
not have been possible.  
1  South Africa Sugar Association v Minister of Trade and Industry 2017 4 All SA 555 
(GP) (hereafter SASA). 
2  Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance 2017 ZAWCHC 110 (29 September 
2017) (hereafter Pioneer Foods). 
3  See s 229 of the Customs Duty Act 30 of 2014 (CDA) read with s 944 of the Customs 
Control Act 31 of 2014. The Customs Control Act focusses on the implementation of 
the customs control system.  
4  SASA para 20. 
5  SASA para 20. 
6  SASA para 21. 
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commitment that it would process the information provided to it by the Sugar 
Association within a day and submit a recommendation to the Minister of 
Trade and Industry.7 On 3 August 2017 the Sugar Association sought a 
similar undertaking from the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Trade 
and Industry.8 Subsequently the Minister of Trade and Industry provided the 
Sugar Association with the undertaking to consider and act on any 
recommendation relating to the import duty on sugar received from ITAC 
within five days of the receipt of the recommendation.9 However, the 
Minister of Finance declined to give the Sugar Association a similar 
undertaking.10 Consequently the Sugar Association then sought an order 
from the High Court directing the Minister of Finance to effect any 
"'consequential"' amendments to the Schedules to the CEA within five 
working days, or such other time as the court considered just, of having 
received the recommendation of the Minister of Trade and Industry.11 
In Pioneer Foods the applicant sought an order from the High Court 
compelling the Minister of Finance and the National Treasury to cause 
updated custom tariff duties on wheat imports to be published in the 
Government Gazette by no later than 8 September 2017 in terms of the 
CEA.12 The applicant argued that since updated duties had already been 
determined by ITAC, which duties had been endorsed by the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, the Minister of Finance was simply required to Gazette 
them in order to bring them into operation.13  
3  The legal issue in SASA and Pioneer Foods 
The nub of the dispute in SASA was the scope of the powers of the Minister 
of Finance upon the receipt of a request from the Minister of Trade and 
Industry to amend an import duty as provided by section 48(1)(b) of the 
CEA.14 Similarly, in Pioneer Foods the court was called upon to decide on 
the nature of the power conferred upon the Minister of Finance in terms of 
section 48(1)(b) of the CEA.15 In essence, section 48(1)(b) of the CEA 
provides that: 
                                            
7  SASA para 21. 
8  SASA para 22. 
9  SASA para 22. 
10  SASA para 22. 
11  SASA para 23. 
12  Pioneer Foods para 1. 
13  Pioneer Foods para 18. 
14  SASA paras 24, 29. 
15  Pioneer Foods paras 22-23. 
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The Minister of Finance may, by notice in the Gazette, amend the General 
Notes to Schedule 1 and Part 1 of the said Schedule and Part 2 of the said 
Schedule, in so far as it relates to imported goods, in order, inter alia, to give 
effect to any request by the Minister of Trade and Industry and for Economic 
Co-ordination. 
At this juncture, it must be noted that the Minister of Finance is also 
empowered by other provisions of the CEA to impose or vary any duty on 
specific goods through amendment to the Schedules of the CEA.16 The 
focus of this paper is solely the amendment of Schedule 1 in the manner 
contemplated by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. 
4  The arguments of the parties in SASA and Pioneer Foods 
In SASA the Sugar Association contended that the role of the Minister of 
Finance in terms of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA resembles that of a 
"registrar".17 In the view of the Sugar Association, the power of the Minister 
of Finance is only to assess a request by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
for legality.18 As support for this contention, the Sugar Association proffered 
that the approach of the Minister of Finance "duplicates the work already 
done by ITAC and the Minister of Trade and Industry" and this assertion 
was evinced by the object of the International Trade Administration Act 71 
of 2002 (ITAA) as set out in section 2.19 Furthermore, the Sugar Association 
argued that it is within the Minister of Trade and Industry's mandate to 
pronounce on trade policy and directives and regulate the imports and 
exports of the Republic of South Africa.20 It was also submitted that ITAC 
operates as a specialist body, and thus the court must accord some 
deference to its findings.21 To this end, the Sugar Association cited the 
decision in International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereafter SCAW), which described the powers of the 
                                            
16  For instance, the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (CEA) permits the Minister of 
Finance in accordance with any request from the Minister of Trade and Industry to 
amend Schedule 2 by notice in the Gazette: to withdraw or reduce any anti-dumping 
duty as provided by s 56(2); to withdraw or reduce any countervailing duty as 
provided by s 56(A)(2); and to withdraw or reduce any safeguard duty as per s 57(2). 
17  SASA para 24.  
18  SASA para 24. 
19  SASA para 30. S 2 of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 (ITAA) 
provides that the object of the Act is to foster economic growth and development in 
order to raise incomes and promote investment and employment in the Republic and 
within the Common Custom Area by establishing an efficient and effective system 
for the administration of international trade subject to this Act and the SACU 
Agreement. 
20  SASA para 30. See s 5 of the ITAA, which provides that the Minister of Trade and 
Industry may by notice in the Gazette and in accordance with the Constitution or any 
other applicable law make pronouncements on Trade Statements or Directives. 
21  SASA para 30. 
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Minister of Trade and Industry as being wide and involving polycentric 
considerations.22 Consequently the Sugar Association argued that the 
Minister of Trade and Industry is not required to dogmatically follow the 
reasoning and findings of ITAC.23 On the strength of these submissions, the 
Sugar Association submitted that it is unnecessary for the Minister of 
Finance to conduct an extensive analysis because the work which the 
Minister of Finance seeks to undertake has already been done by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry.24 
In response, the Minister of Finance contended that he is vested with a full 
decision making power.25 Thus, the Minister of Finance argued that he will 
make a decision only when he is satisfied that the competing interests of 
economic policies, the fiscus and sugar industry participants have been 
balanced.26 Thus the Minister of Finance saw his/her power as constituting 
more than merely "'rubberstamping"' the decision of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry.  
In the same vein, in Pioneer Foods the applicant argued that if one accorded 
due consideration to the circumstances under which the Minister of Finance 
may exercise his/her powers to amend Schedule 1 customs duties in terms 
of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA, these largely involve situations where s/he 
is merely required, "mechanistically", and "as a formality" to give effect to 
the decision of the Minister of Trade and Industry in this regard.27 Thus it 
was argued that the role of the Minister of Finance is merely to "rubberstamp 
decisions taken elsewhere".28 The applicant also described the Minister of 
Finance's function in respect of section 48(1)(b) as constituting an 
"administrative" task which obliged him/her only to "rubberstamp and give 
effect to the tariffs previously determined by ITAC".29 Thus, the applicant 
argued that the Minister of Finance's role was simply to verify the accuracy 
of ITAC's tariff calculations.30 In response, the Minister of Finance argued 
that section 48(1)(b) confers on him/her wide and discretionary executive 
powers which when exercised were in effect legislative in nature.31  
                                            
22  SASA para 31; International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 4 SA 618 (CC) para 97. 
23  SASA para 31. 
24  SASA para 31. 
25  SASA para 24. 
26  SASA para 24. 
27  Pioneer Foods para 24. 
28  Pioneer Foods para 24. 
29  Pioneer Foods para 18. 
30  Pioneer Foods para 18. 
31  Pioneer Foods para 20. 
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Consequently, the principal argument of the applicants in both SASA and 
Pioneer Foods was that section 48(1)(b) of the CEA bestows upon the 
Minister of Finance only the power to "'rubberstamp"' the decision of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, whereas the Minister of Finance, as a 
respondent in both matters, argued that he was conferred with the discretion 
to either accept or decline the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry.  
5  Critical appraisal of the findings of the High Court in 
SASA and Pioneer Foods  
5.1  The language of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA 
Firstly, the court in SASA held that the argument that the role of the Minister 
of Finance is similar to that of a "registrar" does not find any support in the 
language of the CEA.32 The court noted without deciding the issue that the 
wide power conferred on the Minister of Finance under section 48(1)(e) may 
be exercised only in instances which do not fall under sections 48(1)(a)-
(d).33 But the court held that use of the word "otherwise" in section 48(1)(e), 
supports the interpretation which the court favoured.34 In the view of the 
court, the word "otherwise" favoured the conclusion that the power 
conferred on the Minister of Finance is one which s/he may generally 
exercise when s/he has come to the conclusion that it is in the "public 
interest" to do so.35 The court then held that the CEA is inundated with 
powers conferred on the Minister of Finance in relation to duties which s/he 
may exercise when s/he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so.36 
Thus the court held that it is within the confines of the law for the legislature 
to require approvals by more than one decision maker for the ultimate 
effectiveness of the proposed action.37 This is because the court was of the 
view that the concurrence in the decision making powers between the 
Minister of Finance and the Minister of Trade and Industry borne out of 
section 48(1)(b) of the CEA does not detract from this conclusion.38 The 
court reasoned that this point is evinced by the provisions of Chapter VI of 
the CEA which deals with anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties 
and safeguard measures.39  
                                            
32  SASA para 35. 
33  SASA para 35. 
34  SASA para 35. 
35  SASA para 35. 
36  SASA para 35. 
37  SASA para 36. 
38  SASA para 36. 
39  SASA para 37. 
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In the Chapter VI, instances the Minister of Finance is endowed with powers 
to impose or vary anti-dumping and countervailing duties and impose or 
vary safeguard measures.40 However, the Minister of Finance is required to 
act in relation to these duties and measures only in accordance with a 
request by the Minister of Trade and lndustry.41 The empowering provisions 
in Chapter VI clearly constrain the Minister of Finance, in the exercise of 
his/her power, to impose or vary duties or measures to instances where the 
Minister of Finance has been requested by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry to impose such duties or measures.42 In such a case the Minister 
of Finance has a choice: the Minister of Finance may either impose or vary 
the duty or measure in accordance with the request of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry or the Minister of Finance may decline to act at all in 
accordance with the powers conferred by Chapter VI of the CEA.43 In such 
cases, the Minister of Finance may not act unilaterally.44 This is because 
the language (in accordance with ...) makes it clear that s/he may not.45 
However, section 55 does not require that the Minister of Finance must 
agree with or defer to the Minister of Trade and Industry and that the former 
Minister is not precluded by law from conducting his/her own independent 
investigation and analysis of the subject matter of the request received from 
the latter.46 On the contrary, Brink47 submits that even though section 56(2) 
is framed in the form of a request, the Minister of Finance has no discretion 
in this regard.  
Counsel for the Sugar Association had relied on the dictum of the court in 
Association of Meat Exporters v International Trade Commission, which 
held that when withdrawing or reducing, with or without retrospective effect, 
any such duty or otherwise amending the Second Schedule through section 
56(2) of the CEA, the Minister of Finance likewise acts in accordance with 
a request by the Minister of Trade and lndustry.48 Without any elaboration, 
the court in SASA held that this dictum does not advance the Sugar 
                                            
40  SASA para 37. 
41  SASA para 37. See s 56(2)(a) of the CEA which provides that the imposition of any 
anti-dumping duty, a countervailing duty in the case of subsidised export as so 
defined or a safeguard duty in respect of any imported goods, shall be in accordance 
with any request by the Minister of Trade and Industry.  
42  SASA para 37. 
43  SASA para 37. 
44  SASA para 37. 
45  SASA para 37. 
46  SASA para 37. 
47  Brink 2012 http://tinyurl.com/zk633kd fn 212. 
48  SASA para 38; Association of Meat Importers v ITAC 2013 4 All SA 253 (SCA) para 
105. 
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Association's case.49 This finding may be correct but it is my view that this 
contention deserved further consideration. This is because the term "in 
accordance with" means that the Minister of Finance must ensure that 
his/her decision is in line with the request of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. Thus, the term "in accordance with" denotes conforming or 
complying and does not imply the element of discretion. A decision by the 
Minister of Finance to decline the request of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry would be contrary to the purpose of section 56 of the CEA. Thus 
the duty of the Minister of Finance is simply to "implement" the Minister of 
Trade and Industry's request.50  
Counsel for the Sugar Association also relied on certain remarks made by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Chairman, Board of Trade v Brenco Inc 
(Brenco).51 However, the court in SASA held that in Brenco the nature of 
the power of the Minister of Finance was not in issue.52 This reading of the 
decision in Brenco appears not to be correct. This is because the court in 
Brenco held that one of the issues it had to decide on was: 
The nature of the powers and the sequence of decision-making between the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of Finance and hence, the 
relationship between the powers conferred on each of them.53  
Unfortunately, the court in Brenco did not offer the required guidance or 
elucidate appropriately on this issue. Suffice it to say that the court held that 
the role of the Minister of Trade and Industry includes a consideration of 
policy.54 Significantly, the court in Brenco held that the Minister of Trade and 
Industry has no power to amend the terms of the investigating authority's 
recommendation or to effect such changes, but s/he must refer the matter 
back to the investigating authority.55 This means that the Minister of Trade 
and Industry is permitted to either accept or decline the recommendation of 
ITAC but s/he is barred from amending the terms of ITAC's 
recommendation. It follows then that the Minister of Finance has no 
                                            
49  SASA para 38. 
50  Farm Frites v International Trade Administration Commission (unreported) case 
number 32263/14 of 20 May 2014 (hereafter, Farm Frites) para 4; Progress Office 
Machines v SARS 2008 2 SA 13 (SCA) para 4.  
51  SASA para 32; Chairman, Board of Trade v Brenco Inc 2001 4 SA 511 SCA 
(hereafter, Brenco). 
52  SASA para 32. 
53  Brenco paras 19.1, 19.2. 
54  Brenco para 71. 
55  Brenco para 71. It is must be noted that the decision in Brenco was made in the 
context of the Board on Tariffs and Trade Act 107 of 1986, whose investigating body 
was the Board on Tariffs and Trade, which was the body tasked with investigating 
dumping prior to the advent of the ITAA. Also see Brink 2013 TSAR 434-435. 
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discretion to amend ITAC's recommendation. Thus, the nature of the power 
of the Minister of Finance was an issue before the court in Brenco. 
Ultimately the court in SASA held that section 48(1) provides that the 
Minister of Finance "'may amend"': which is language that is directory in 
nature and thus implies powers which confer an element of discretion on 
their holders.56 The court noted that such language is by itself not always 
decisive, just as language which goes the other way (e.g. must or shall) 
does not always render a non-compliance as a nullity.57 Nevertheless, the 
court held that if the object of the legislation had been to reduce the power 
of the Minister of Finance, this could easily have been done by appropriate 
language. The court therefore found that the choice of language evinced a 
wide discretion on the part of the Minister of Finance in relation to section 
48(1)(b) of the CEA.58 Thus the court held that the provisions of the CEA 
confer on the Minister of Finance the power to make the final decision, 
subject only to Parliament, to determine appropriate customs duties.59 
However, on the basis of the court's reasoning that the word "may" is not 
always decisive, it can be argued that the true purpose of section 48(1)(b) 
is derived from the restriction later in the same provision, that the Minister 
of Finance "must give effect" to the request of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry. The term "to give effect" denotes conforming or complying with the 
request of the Minister of Trade and Industry. The Minister of Finance has 
no election or discretion in this regard. If the Minister of Finance declines 
the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry, s/he is not giving effect to 
the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry as required by section 
48(1)(b) of the CEA. In fact, the term "give effect to" is the "appropriate 
language" that should have indicated to the court that the legislature had 
intended to "reduce the powers" of the Minister of Finance in this regard. 
This notion is in line with the finding of the High Court in Farm Frites which 
held that the role of the Minister of Finance is to "implement the financial 
aspects" of ITAC's recommendation.60 Similarly, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has held that the amendment of the schedules to the CEA is the 
"responsibility" of the Minister of Finance.61 Thus, if the Minister of Finance 
declines the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry, s/he is acting 
                                            
56  SASA para 39. 
57  SASA para 39. 
58  SASA para 39. 
59  SASA para 33. 
60  Farm Frites para 4. 
61  Minister of Finance v Paper Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2008 6 SA 
540 (SCA) (hereafter, Paper Manufacturers) para 7.  
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ultra vires or unlawfully because s/he is assuming powers that were never 
conferred upon him/her by the legislature.  
The reasoning of the court in SASA mirrors the ratio of the court in Pioneer 
Foods, which held that is clear that when the Minister exercises his/her 
powers to amend Schedule 1 customs duties under section 48, including 
import duties of the kind that feature in this matter, s/he must consider what 
will be in the public interest, and the qualifying word "otherwise", which 
appears in the relevant phrase in section 48(1)(e) read contextually, does 
not detract from such an interpretation.62 The court in Pioneer Foods held 
that this interpretation of section 48 is informed by a contextual and 
purposive approach.63 The court then observed that these powers are 
postulated in wide, discretionary and permissive (s/he "may"), and not 
obligatory terms.64 Read contextually with reference to this matter, the 
Minister of Finance may amend, but is not compelled to amend customs 
duties on wheat imports as listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 when and if s/she 
deems it "expedient" in the public interest; i.e. when and if s/he considers it 
necessary in the public interest to do so.65  
It is my submission that the High Court's rejection of the "duplication" 
argument merits further consideration. The findings of the High Court in both 
SASA and Pioneer Foods on the competencies of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry appear to be arbitrary. Prudence requires that the courts must not 
be too eager to accept the view that the Minister of Trade and Industry lacks 
the competence to conduct a holistic assessment of the recommendation of 
ITAC despite jurisprudence to the contrary. It has been held that the Minister 
of Trade and Industry is entitled to assimilate polycentric factors such as 
"diplomatic relationships, the country's balance of payments, the regional or 
global trading conditions, goods needed to foster economic growth, into 
his/her decision making process and so forth".66 This means that both the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of Finance conduct a holistic 
evaluation. Thus, as contended by the applicant in SASA, the holistic 
evaluation that is meant to be conducted by the Minister of Finance would 
be a "duplication" of the assessment conducted by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry.67 This is particularly so in the light of the fact that ITAC and the 
                                            
62  Pioneer Foods para 30. 
63  Pioneers Foods para 27; Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) (hereafter, Endumeni Municipality) paras 18-19. 
64  Pioneer Foods para 30. 
65  Pioneer Foods para 30. 
66  SCAW para 98; Brenco para 71; Farm Frites para 4. 
67  See SASA para 30. 
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Minister of Trade and Industry have a wider mandate on the basis of section 
2 of ITAA rather than merely determining the duties. The Minister of Trade 
and Industry and ITAC are better placed to assess the need for a duty. In 
fact, it could be argued that it is against the "public interest" to decline a 
request to impose an import duty that could protect a vulnerable industry. 
This much is conceded by both courts in SASA and Pioneer Foods.68 A 
sensible approach to interpretation must be preferred to one that leads to 
unreasonable or unbusinesslike results or that hinders the apparent 
purpose of legislation.69 The approach to section 48(1)(b) in both SASA and 
Pioneer Foods caused "unbusinesslike results that undermine[d] the object 
of import duties", which is to protect local industries and consumers. 
5.2  The "public interest" principle  
At the outset, it is prudent to outline the relevant subsections of section 48 
of the CEA, which provide for the "public interest" principle: 
(1)(e) The Minister may from time to time by notice in the Gazette amend the 
General Notes to Schedule No. 1 and Part 1 of the said Schedule or substitute 
the said Part 1 and amend Part 2 of the said Schedule in so far as it relates to 
imported goods whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest 
otherwise to do so. 
(2) The Minister may from time to time by like notice amend or withdraw or, if 
so withdrawn, insert Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5A or Part 5B of Schedule No. 
1, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so: Provided 
that the Minister may, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest 
to do so, reduce any duty specified in the said Parts with retrospective effect 
from such date and to such extent as may be determined by him in such 
notice. 
(2A)(a)(i) The Minister may from time to time by like notice, whenever he 
deems it expedient in the public interest to do so, authorize the International 
Trade Administration Commission or the Commissioner to withdraw, with or 
without retrospective effect, and subject to such conditions as the said 
Commission or Commissioner may determine, any duty specified in Part 2 or 
Part 4 of Schedule No. 1. 
(4) The Minister may, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to 
do so, by notice in the Gazette impose an export duty, on such basis as he 
may determine, in respect of any goods intended for export or any class or 
kind of such goods or any goods intended for export in circumstances 
specified in such notice and any export duty so imposed shall be set out in the 
form of a schedule which shall be deemed to be incorporated in Schedule No. 
1 as Part 6 thereof and to constitute an amendment of Schedule No. 1. 
(4A)(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act contained, the 
Minister may, whenever he deems it expedient in the public interest to do so, 
                                            
68  Pioneer Foods para 47; SASA para 40.  
69  Endumeni Municipality para 18. 
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by notice in the Gazette, insert Part 8 of Schedule No. 1, and if so inserted 
withdraw or amend that Part for the purpose of specifying that any duty 
leviable under any heading or item of Part 1, 2 or 4 of Schedule No. 1 shall 
not be leviable under that Part, but shall be leviable under the said Part 8 at 
the time of entry for home consumption for use by any person, government, 
department, administration or body as may be specified by him in such notice. 
To this end, the court in SASA held that the word "otherwise" in section 
48(1)(e) favours the conclusion that the power conferred on the Minister of 
Finance is one which s/he may generally exercise when s/he has come to 
the conclusion that it is in the "public interest" that s/he do so.70 The court 
then held that the CEA is "replete" with powers conferred on the Minister of 
Finance in respect of duties which s/he may exercise when s/he deems it 
"expedient in the public interest to do so".71 In the same vein, the court in 
Pioneer Foods held that section 48(1)(b) must always be read in such a 
manner that it gives effect to the "public interest".72 Thus the High Court is 
of the view that section 48(1)(b), when read in the context of section 48, 
requires that the Minister of Finance must assess whether the request of 
the Minister of Trade and Industry is in line with the "public interest" 
principle. This approach, although motivated by a cogent rule of 
interpretation that a section must be read as a whole, is misconceived. I am 
of the view that the High Court decisions in SASA and Pioneer Foods 
misconstrued the "public interest" principle as provided by section 48. 
The "public interest" principle in section 48(1)(e) operates as an 
extraordinary tool through which the Minister of Finance may directly amend 
the Schedule 1 in exceptional circumstances. Hence the limitation that such 
a decision must be used when it is "expedient" or "necessary" to do so. Thus 
the "public interest" principle in section 48(1)(e) functions as a directly 
empowering provision that authorises the Minister of Finance to act on 
his/her own accord in the absence of a request from the Minister of Trade 
and Industry. This is exactly the same power conferred on the Minister of 
Finance by section 48(2), which empowers him/her, if it is expedient in the 
public interest, to reduce duties in Part 2, Part 4 or Part 5 of Schedule 1. 
The same could be said of the power conferred on the Minister of Finance 
by section 48(2A), except that in this regard, the power bestowed on the 
Minister of Finance is more robust. This is because under section 48(2A) 
the Minister of Finance, if s/he deems it to be expedient in the public interest, 
can authorise the Director-General: Trade and Industry or the 
Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service to withdraw, with or 
                                            
70  SASA para 35. 
71  SASA para 35. 
72  Pioneer Foods paras 30, 31, 39. 
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without retrospective effect, and subject to such conditions as the said 
Director-General or Commissioner may determine, any duty specified in 
Part 2 or Part 4 of Schedule 1. This power in section 48(2A) clearly resides 
with the Minister of Finance, but what is ironic about this power is that it 
gives the Minister of Finance sweeping powers to delegate this power to a 
functionary in the department of Trade and Industry. Similarly, the CEA in 
section 48(4) grants the Minister of Finance, if s/he deems it expedient in 
the public interest to do so, the power to impose export duties on his/her 
own accord. In the same vein, section 48(4A) of the CEA essentially 
provides that the Minister of Finance is empowered to amend Schedule 1 if 
it is expedient in the public interest to do so. Thus, all the "public interest" 
provisions in section 48 are subject to the proviso that they must be used if 
it is "expedient" to do so.  
This invariably posits the question as to the meaning of term "expedient". 
The term "expedient" in section 48(1)(e), denotes in the language of the 
court in Pioneer Foods that such a power must not be used in every instance 
but rather when it is "necessary".73 This interpretation of the term 
"expedient" to mean "necessary" is confirmed by the corresponding 
provision in the CDA, which provides that the Minister of Finance may act 
in the public interest only if it is "necessary".74 It follows, then, that the notion 
that the section 48 "public interest" enquiry must always be conducted every 
time the Minister of Finance receives a request from the Minister of Trade 
and Industry to amend Schedule 1 in terms of section 48(1)(b) contradicts 
the dictum of the court in Pioneer Foods that such an enquiry must be done 
only when it is "necessary". Thus the nature of the power conferred on the 
Minister of Finance in respect of section 48(1)(b) differs materially from the 
power conferred on the Minister of Finance in respect of the "public interest" 
provisions in section 48.  
Furthermore, it is clear that all the "public interest" provisions in section 48 
have no connection to section 48(1)(b). Section 48(1)(b) is prompted by the 
conduct of the Minister of Trade and Industry in requesting the Minister of 
Finance to give effect to ITAC's recommendation, whereas the "public 
interest" provisions are not triggered by any request of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry. This notion is endorsed by the dictum of the court in SCAW, 
which held that without a prior investigation and recommendation, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry may not, on his or her own, request the 
                                            
73  See Pioneer Foods para 30. 
74  See s 8(2) of the CDA. The CDA will replace the provisions of the CEA relating to 
the imposition and collection of import and export duties, at a date to be determined 
by the President. 
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Minister of Finance to impose an anti-dumping duty.75 Thus the "public 
interest" provisions are self-standing provisions that confer wide and 
discretionary powers on the Minister of Finance to directly amend the 
Schedule 1 of the CEA, but bear no relationship to the power conferred on 
the Minister of Finance in section 48(1)(b).  
It seems plausible, then, that the "public interest" provisions in section 48 
must not be read together with section 48(1)(b). In fact, the court in SASA 
conceded as much when it held that it was prepared to assume, without 
making a finding on the issue, that the wide power bestowed on the Minister 
of Finance under section 48(1)(e) may be exercised only in instances 
outside of sections 48(1)(a)-(d).76 Needless to say, this does not preclude 
the Minister of Trade and Industry from requesting the Minister of Finance 
to consider amending a duty if s/he considers it to be in the "public interest" 
on the basis of section 48(1)(e). This is the one of the instances when the 
Minister of Finance can decline the request of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, because in this instance the power to accept or decline this request 
resides solely with the Minister of Finance.  
It follows then that the Minister of Finance must always accede to a request 
of the Minister of Trade and Industry as provided by section 48(1)(b). If the 
Minister of Finance has reservations about this "request", s/he must first 
impose the duty as requested by the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
Thereafter, on the basis of section 48(1)(e), which confers the widest 
powers in section 48, the Minister of Finance can initiate the process 
through Treasury of assessing if it is in the "public interest"; and if it is found 
to be so, s/he can then amend the Schedule without consulting the Minister 
of Trade and Industry. This approach may seem strange, but this is the only 
legal method that is provided by section 48(1) of the CEA. This is in 
accordance with the ratio of the court in Endumeni Municipality, which held 
that judges must wary of the proclivity to "substitute what they regard as 
reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually used".77 This 
reasoning also resonates with the approach of the CDA, which provides that 
in the event that an amendment to the Customs Tariff of the CDA (Schedule 
1 of the CEA) results in unforeseen or unintended consequences when the 
amendment was made, the Minister of Finance in consultation with the 
Minister of Trade and Industry may adjust the amendment to address that 
unforeseen or unintended consequence with effect from the date on which 
                                            
75  SCAW para 108. 
76  SASA para 35. 
77  Endumeni Municipality para 18. 
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the amendment took effect or any later date.78 Thus, section 10 of the CDA 
permits the ex post facto amendment of the Customs Tariff to address 
unintended or unforeseen consequences. It follows then that the approach 
of the High Court in both SASA and Pioneer Foods lacks a textual basis in 
the CEA.  
The only way that the "public interest" principle should have been a 
consideration in both matters should have been through the court's 
assessing whether the Minister of Finance complied with his/her 
constitutional obligation to approve the request of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry only if it is in the "public interest". It is trite law that the "public 
interest" principle is a basic principle of South African law. This is because 
it has been held that public functionaries, as organs of the state, have a 
constitutional duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill 
of Rights, and as bearers of this duty they must perform their functions in 
the public interest.79 It follows then that since the Minister of Finance is an 
organ of state s/he would have been compelled to act in the "public interest" 
as required by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the 
Public Service Act and precedents in this regard.80 Thus the High Court in 
both matters should have assessed the "public interest" factor not through 
the ambit of section 48(1) but through the Constitution and the Public 
Service Act.  
To this end the court in SASA actually attempted the "public interest" enquiry 
through the avenue of the Constitution, although the court did not complete 
the enquiry. The court in SASA did not have regard to the provisions of the 
Public Service Act in line with the principle of constitutional subsidiarity.81 It 
was held that the Minister of Finance in this regard is performing a legislative 
function which requires him/her to perform his/her duties in the interests of 
the Republic.82 This is the manifestation of the "public interest" principle. 
                                            
78  Section 10(1) of the CDA.  
79  Khumalo v Member of the Executive Council for Education: KwaZulu Natal 2014 5 
SA 579 (CC) para 36; s 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
See also, President of the Republic of South Africa v Office of the Public Protector 
2018 2 SA 100 (GP) para 122; M & G Limited v 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising 
Committee South Africa Limited 2011 5 SA 163 (GSJ) para 255.  
80  See s 195(1) of the Constitution read with s 5(7)(a) of the Public Service Act 103 of 
1994.  
81  My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly 2015 ZACC 31 (30 
September 2015) para 53; Mbatha v University of Zululand 2014 2 BCLR 123 (CC) 
para 172; Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 73; Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) paras 21-26. 
82  SASA para 33. 
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The court then held that the duty to act in the "public interest" arises out of 
the oaths of office of legislators as well as members of the executive and 
judicial officers, to be found in Schedule 2 to the Constitution, which requires 
the office bearer to swear or affirm to be faithful to the Republic.83 In this 
regard the legislator acts in a fiduciary capacity which is informed by the 
principle of rationality in their investigations.84 This rationality enquiry arises 
from the requirement that the exercise of a legislative power must have a 
cogent basis.85 In essence, rationality requires that the exercise of the 
legislative power must not be arbitrary and thus demands that there must 
be a link between the instrument employed by the legislator and the goal 
sought to be achieved.86 If there is no such link, the instrument contravenes 
the rule of law and is invalid.87 It follows then that the legislator is entitled to 
conduct the necessary research that enables him/her to fulfil his/her 
legislative mandate.88 Consequently, the court in SASA found that there is 
nothing in the language of the CEA which reduces the role of the Minister 
of Finance in this regard to that "akin to a registrar".89 Alternatively, this 
reasoning of the court in SASA means that not only the Minister of Finance 
is required to act in the "public interest" but that the Minister of Trade and 
Industry is also required to do so. This strengthens the argument that the 
request of the Minister of Trade and Industry does not require the section 
48(1) "public interest" enquiry of the Minister of Finance.  
It bears mention that the court in Pioneer Foods referred to the power 
conferred on the Minister of Finance through section 48(1)(e) of the CEA as 
a "residual power".90 It is not clear what the court meant by this statement 
but within the context of the court's reasoning, it is presumed that the court 
saw the power conferred upon the Minister of Finance in section 48(1)(e) as 
the final stage in the process of deciding whether to impose a duty after the 
recommendation of ITAC and the subsequent request of the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, as provided for by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. As I 
                                            
83  SASA para 33. 
84  SASA para 33. 
85  Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 5 SA 
171 (CC) (hereafter, Merafong) para 62-63. 
86  Merafong para 62; United Democratic Movement v President of the RSA (No 2) 2003 
1 SA 495 (CC) para 68 (hereafter, UDM 2); Bel Porto School Governing Body v 
Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 45; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
of SA: In Re Ex Parte President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 85; Prinsloo v 
Van der Linde 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) para 36. 
87  UDM 2 para 55. See s 1(c) of the Constitution. 
88  SASA para 33. 
89  SASA para 35. 
90  Pioneer Foods para 28.  
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have argued above, this approach is flawed and lacks a textual basis in the 
CEA.  
5.3  The separation of powers issue  
The separation of powers issue was significant to the findings of the courts 
in SASA and Pioneer Foods. The court in SASA held that there is nothing 
in the language of the CEA that reduces the role of the Minister of Finance 
to that of a "registrar".91 The resultant overlap in the decision-making powers 
of the two Ministers and the fact that investigations are conducted by other 
organs of state do not detract from its conclusion.92 There is nothing illegal 
in the situation that arises when the legislature prescribes, in effect, that 
approvals by more than one decision maker are required for the efficacy of 
the action contemplated.93 Thus, the court held that the principle of the 
separation of powers requires that the decision makers in the Treasury and 
the Minister of Finance approach their responsibilities as they deem 
appropriate as long as the manner in which they do so is rational.94  
Similarly, in Pioneer Foods the court was of the view that in exercising 
his/her powers the Minister of Finance is invariably conducting a policy 
exercise, in which s/he will have to accord due consideration to a number of 
issues, including fiscal and economic matters.95 This much is further 
apparent if one has regard to the nature of the assessments conducted by 
the various components of the National Treasury and the South African 
Revenue Services and associated departments, before the Minister of 
Finance ultimately decides whether or not to promulgate the amended 
duties.96 As such, the Minister of Finance is not merely a "rubberstamp 
functionary".97 Consequently the court in Pioneer Foods held that this 
means that when exercising powers under section 48(1)(b), the Minister of 
Finance is not engaged in administrative action.98  
The court in Pioneer Foods further held that at first blush, when considering 
whether or not to accept a recommendation from ITAC and the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, the Minister of Finance appears to be carrying out an 
executive function, and when the Minister of Finance has considered that 
                                            
91  SASA para 35. 
92  SASA para 36. 
93  SASA para 36. 
94  SASA para 40. 
95  Pioneer Foods para 30. 
96  Pioneer Foods para 30. 
97  Pioneer Foods para 30. 
98  Pioneer Foods para 31. 
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amended import duties are necessary in the public interest and causes them 
to be promulgated in the Gazette, s/he carries out a legislative function.99 It 
was held that this is evinced by section 48(6), which provides that any 
amendment, withdrawal or insertion made under section 48 shall, unless 
Parliament otherwise provides, lapse on the last day of the next calendar 
year following such action.100  
Secondly, given that the Minister of Finance exercises a policy choice which 
lies within his/her terrain, it is not up to a court to second-guess her/him, nor 
should a court interfere with the process, save in obvious cases when 
irreversible harm would occur and it is constitutionally appropriate to grant 
the order concerned.101 This reasoning is in line with the precedents in this 
regard.102 Thus, the court held that the power contemplated in terms of 
section 48(1)(b), similarly constitutes a power which lies in the terrain of the 
executive authority of the Minister of Finance, and especially in instances 
whereby the exercise of such power is underway, it should not be interfered 
with by way of a mandatory order, save in the clearest of cases, and only 
where irreversible harm might occur should such an order not be granted.103 
The court was of the view that neither of these considerations were proved 
in this matter, and to have granted an order in the terms sought by the 
applicant would therefore have unjustifiably contravened the principle of the 
separation of powers.104 Thus the court in Pioneer Foods held that it is 
evident that a request by the Minister of Trade and Industry for an 
amendment to the import duties on wheat does not result in an automatic 
acceptance and amendment by the Minister of Finance and it does not 
necessarily follow that a request by the Minister of Trade and Industry will 
necessarily be approved by the Minister of Finance.105 
5.4  The powers of the Minister of Finance in the CDA regime 
As noted earlier, the CEA, which is the legislation upon which the SASA and 
Pioneer Foods were based, will eventually be replaced by the CDA in 
respect of the imposition and collection of import and export duties, at a date 
to be determined by the President. A peek at the CDA in this regard reveals 
                                            
99  Pioneer Foods para 31. 
100  Pioneer Foods para 31. 
101  Pioneer Foods para 32. 
102  SCAW para 101; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 48; Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) paras 68-69; Paper Manufacturers para 18. 
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some interesting observations. Firstly, section 8(1)(b) of the CDA requires 
that the Minister of Finance must amend the Customs Tariff (Schedule 
1,2,3,4 and 5 of the CEA)106 if the Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC 
requests the amendment for implementation in accordance with the ITAA 
duties or other measures to foster local economic activity. Section 8(1)(b) of 
the CDA is the successor to section 48(1)(b) of the CEA and it makes some 
fundamental changes to its forerunner. The immediate implication of section 
8(1)(b) of the CDA is that it brings much-needed clarity to the scope of the 
power of the Minister of Finance in relation to a request from the Minister of 
Trade and Industry or ITAC to amend the Schedule 1/Customs Tariff. This 
is because the Minister of Finance under section 8(1)(b) of the CDA has no 
"discretion" or "election" in respect of the request of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry or ITAC. The Minister of Finance under the section 8(1)(b) 
regime must "implement" without fail the amendment as requested by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC. This reasoning is confirmed by the 
South African Revenue Services, which has explained that the Minister of 
Finance's power to amend the Customs Tariff is now more strictly defined 
because the CDA now sets out the circumstances in which the Minister of 
Finance "must" amend and those where the Minister of Finance "may" 
amend.107 This means that since section 8(1)(b) employs the term "must", 
then the Minister of Finance does not have a right of election or discretion 
in respect of the request of the Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC.  
Secondly, under the CDA, the power to make a request to the Minister of 
Finance to effect an amendment to the Customs Tariff/Schedule 1 will no 
longer reside solely with the Minister of Trade and Industry. This is because 
section 8(1)(b) permits either ITAC or the Minister of Trade and Industry to 
request the Minister of Finance to implement the amendment as required 
by the ITAA duties or to promote local economic activity. This provision is 
significant because it could eliminate litigation in matters such as SASA and 
Pioneer Foods, as the power to accept or decline the request of ITAC would 
in certain instances lie solely with the Minister of Finance.  
However, section 8(1)(b) of the CDA still does not resolve the debate as to 
whether the Minister of Finance "rubberstamps" the decision of the Minister 
of Trade and Industry if the latter Minister makes the request of his/her own 
accord, without a recommendation from ITAC, and on the ground that s/he 
                                            
106  See s 7 of the CDA. 
107  SARS 2016 http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/Documents/customsandexcise/ 
Customs%20Legislation%20-%20An%20Overview%20-%20May%202016.pdf. 
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seeks to "foster local economic activity".108 On the one hand, the ground of 
"fostering local economic activity" is too wide, ambiguous and problematic 
because it could allow the Minister of Trade and Industry to intrude on the 
terrain of ITAC by requesting an amendment to counteract, for instance, the 
"dumping" of a product or to "safeguard" local industry. Such an approach 
would be in conflict with the ITAA and indeed the CDA, which confer upon 
ITAC the exclusive power to investigate and evaluate the need for a 
customs duty, anti-dumping and safeguard duties.109 This reasoning was 
endorsed by the court in SCAW, which held that ITAC has the power to 
investigate, evaluate and make recommendations to the Minister of Trade 
and Industry on the imposition, amendment or removal of customs, anti-
dumping and countervailing duties.110 On the other hand, it is unclear which 
grounds would justify ITAC's requesting an amendment on the basis that it 
is "implementing measures to foster local economic activity". ITAC is a 
specialist investigative body and should not be given wide and non-specific 
powers to implement policy measures that promote "'economic activity"' lest 
it intrude on the policy space of the Minister of Trade and Industry. Similarly, 
granting the Minister of Trade and Industry and ITAC such amorphous 
powers could be regarded as a form of disguised discrimination and 
protectionism which is an affront to the World Trade Organization's 
objectives and rules.111  
Section 8(1)(b) the CDA also implies that ITAC can still make a 
recommendation to the Minister of Trade and Industry, who would then in 
turn request the Minister of Finance to effect such a request. This would still 
bring about the section 48(1)(b) impasse that prompted the litigation in 
SASA and Pioneer Foods.  
Consequently, it is submitted that section 8(1)(b) should be amended to 
explicitly say that the Minister of Finance has the power to accept or decline 
the request of either the Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC. This is 
necessitated by the dictum in SASA and Pioneer Foods that words such as 
"may" or "must" are not necessarily decisive and thus the CDA's attempt to 
resolve this problem in this way may suffer the same fate as section 
                                            
108  The Memorandum on the Objects of the Customs Duty Bill does not shed any light on 
this issue apart from providing in para 3.3, that the Minister of Finance is authorised 
to amend the Customs Tariff by notice in the Government Gazette.  
109  See s 16(1) read with s 26 (1)(c)-(d) and s 30 of the ITAA; ss 15-17 of the CDA.  
110  SCAW para 6. 
111  See the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (1994); see generally the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(1994). 
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48(1)(b).112 Alternatively, section 8(1)(b) could be amended to either remove 
the Minister of Trade and Industry from the decision-making process or 
explicitly provide that both the Minister of Trade and Industry and the 
Minister of Finance must agree on the decision to implement the 
amendment to the Customs Tariff to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation. 
Furthermore, section 8(1)(b) could be amended to say that the Minister of 
Finance will only review and approve the financial aspects whereas the 
Minister of Trade and Industry will only review and approve the trade and 
industry aspects of ITAC's recommendation.  
The third fundamental change in the CDA is that it explicitly differentiates 
between the power of the Minister of Finance to act in the "public interest" 
and the power to impose a duty on imported goods as requested by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC. Section 8(2)(b) of the CDA provides 
that the Minister of Finance, acting in consultation with the Minister of Trade 
and Industry, may amend the Customs Tariff in relation to imported goods 
where section 8(1)(b) does not apply and the amendment is necessary in 
the "public interest". Section 8(2)(b) makes it clear that the "public interest" 
amendment is not related to the section 8(1)(b) request from the Minister of 
Trade and Industry or ITAC. This means that the section 48 "public interest" 
enquiry of the court in Pioneer Foods and SASA would not be permitted in 
the CDA regime except through the Constitution and Public Service Act 
avenues.113 It is commendable that the CDA introduces a consultation 
requirement for the Minister of Finance to seek the views and 
representations of the Minister of Trade and Industry when acting in the 
"public interest". This novel provision aligns the role of the Minister of 
Finance with that of the Minister of Trade and Industry and highlights the 
concurrence of their mandates and interests. It goes without saying that 
section 8(2)(b) will negate unnecessary litigation to clarify the relationship 
between the two Ministers in this regard.  
Lastly, section 8(3) of the CDA explains the requirements for the "request" 
of the Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC, contemplated in section 
8(1)(b) of the CDA. This is because section 8(3) provides that such a 
"request" from the Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC must be made in 
writing and submitted together with a motivation giving the reasons for the 
request, or a report or a ministerial minute in terms of the ITAA, if the request 
is in terms of the ITAA. The requirement to submit written representations 
to the Minister of Finance introduces transparency and affords the Minister 
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of Finance the opportunity to know and understand the reasons that 
prompted the request for a duty. It is presumed that this approach would 
ensure that the Minister of Finance expeditiously implements the request of 
the Minister of Trade and Industry or ITAC, to avoid the lengthy delays and 
losses suffered by the applicants in SASA and Pioneer Foods.  
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper has reflected on the nature of the powers of the Minister of 
Finance and the relationship between and the Minister of Trade and Industry 
in relation to a request from the Minister of Trade and Industry to amend 
Schedule 1 of the CEA as provided by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. This 
assessment was conducted through an evaluation of the High Court 
decisions in SASA and Pioneer Foods, which hinged on the interpretation 
of section 48(1)(b) of the CEA. The High Court held in both cases that the 
role of the Minister of Finance in respect of the power conferred upon 
him/her by section 48(1)(b) is not merely to "'rubberstamp' the decision of 
the Minister of Trade and Industry. Consequently, the High Court in both 
these matters held that section 48(1)(b) confers on the Minister of Finance 
a right to elect to either accept or decline the request of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry to amend Schedule 1 of the CEA. It is this paper's submission 
that if the Minister of Finance declines the request of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry s/he is not "giving effect" to the request of the Minister of Trade 
and Industry as required by section 48(1)(b) of the CEA, and thus s/he is 
acting ultra vires, because s/he is assuming powers that were never 
conferred on him/her by the legislature. This paper also argues that the High 
Court in both matters misconstrued the relationship between section 
48(1)(b) and the "public interest" provisions in section 48, and thus 
unjustifiably stripped the Minister of Trade and Industry of his/her power to 
implement an amendment to Schedule 1. Finally, this paper has also 
reflected on the impact of the CDA on the powers of the Minister of Finance 
in this regard.  
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